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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

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points to supplement the diligent work of the committee. This is in no way intended as a criticism of the work of the select committee, but merely to present an added perspective from a foreign policy point of view.

My first amendment amends the classified report of the select committee to provide some additional directions to the intelligence community on a number of topics, particularly with regard to intelligence about the Soviet Union. I will only single out for comment here a requirement for intensified competitive analysis. That may be a vague term to many because of the classified nature of the intelligence apparatus, but let me say for the record that it is enormously important.

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Mr. President, competitive analysis has been demonstrated by the 1975 A team-B team exercise to be beneficial to better intelligence of our national security. Contending points of view and varying schools of analysis and interpretation are inevitable in the art form—I suppose one would call it—called intelligence. The classified supplement goes into more detail, but I have been assured by the distinguished chairman that the following list of intelligence problems will be studied under appropriate competitive analysis procedures:

- 1 Soviet geopolitical and strategic intentions including the functions of the Soviet Five Year Defense Plan, and the long range Fifteen Year Plan.
- 2 Soviet investigation of the feasibility of detecting submerged submarines through the analysis of data on the surface of the ocean.
- 3 The role of surprise and deception as principles of Soviet military doctrine.
- 4 Soviet perceptions of American military, political, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities.
- 5 The accuracy of Soviet missiles.
- 6 The existence of hidden Soviet missiles for road, rail, and covert soft launch, in strategic reserves.
- 7 The reasons for the continuing underestimation by CIA of Soviet strategic forces in light of the recent statement in the White House Report to Congress on SALT II of June 16, 1980 that "On the basis of the history of U.S. intelligence underestimation, it is unlikely that the numbers of Soviet strategic missile bombers and war head five years from now will be identical or necessarily ever close to their INIE force projections."
- 8 The role of Soviet Bloc intelligence services in the international drug trade.
- 9 Better methodologies for estimating Soviet defense spending.
- 10 The effects of Soviet negotiating and operational deception in arms control.
- 11 Better methods for processing deceptive retaining and resetting detectors and countermeasures.
- 12 Means of overcoming deterring and narcosis against Soviet data denial through Soviet radio-electronic warfare.
- 13 The role of disinformation and forgery in Soviet foreign policy and the extent of Soviet Active Measures disinformation and forgery inside the United States.
- 14 Countermeasures to detect Soviet jamming of U.S. National Technical Means of reconnaissance.

15. The extent of the Soviet lead over the U.S. in developing a space-based, land-based ABM defense, and in developing a space-based ABM defense, including identification of U.S. intelligence gaps on the Soviet SDI program.

16 Soviet civil defense capabilities.
17 Soviet knowledge of U.S. National Technical Means of intelligence collection, and deceptive actions which the USSR might have taken on the basis of that knowledge.

18 The possibility of Soviet Bloc sabotage being among the human errors causing the Space Shuttle Challenger and other recent U.S. strategic space mission explosions.

19 The Soviet Biological and Chemical Warfare threat, and potential U.S. countermeasures.

20 Implications for U.S. national security of Soviet military supremacy.

21 Better means for protecting U.S. intelligence sources and methods and classified information, including reforming the classification system, so as to prevent such cases as the unwise publication of details of the "Chariot" project by The New York Times in June 1975.

22 Better methodologies for estimating yields of Soviet underground nuclear weapons tests, which utilize all the evidence available.

23 Possible limitations in U.S. area search and spot search, reconnaissance capability, and the possibility of a U.S. search and spot National Technical Means of intelligence collector crisis due to the long-term stand-down in the U.S. Space Shuttle and other strategic space launch programs.

24 The possibility that the CIA and the State Department have been penetrated by the KGB at various levels.

25 The contents of the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement prohibiting Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba, and the evidence supporting the charges of President Reagan, the DCI, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy that Soviet Mig-27 fighter-bombers, TU-95 Bear bombers, strategic submarines, and the Soviet Combat Brigade in Cuba violating the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement.

26 The ability of U.S. National Technical Means of intelligence collection to monitor Soviet compliance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in space and with an Anti-Satellite Treaty.

27 The history of Soviet violations of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions and whether the CIA blocked the creation of an Interagency Group to study these violations when first detected in 1976 and 1977.

28 The military implications of Soviet SALT and other arms control violations and the reasons why the CIA resisted evidence and analysis showing Soviet SALT violations for 12 years.

29 Complete analysis of the Popov, Penkovskii, Gouzenko, Nosenko, and Fantei cases including their contribution to intelligence Community analyses and Counterintelligence.

30 Long-term Soviet violations of the 1947 Rio Treaty, through their massive arms shipments to Cuba and Nicaragua.

31 Arresting of drug trafficking, money laundering, arms trafficking, human rights violations, political assassination, and intelligence exchange and collaboration with Castro and Ortega by military leaders of Panama.

32 Reasons for reported CIA long term underestimation of Soviet submarine capabilities.

Mr. President, this amendment as I indicated earlier, has been worked out

through the cooperation of a number of people, including the distinguished chairman of the committee and vice chairman and their very capable and competent staff.

I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DANFORTH). The Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, as my colleague has indicated we have put some effort in the last week or so against the concerns of the Senator from North Carolina.

Let me begin my brief comments in reaction to his amendment by indicating that I appreciate his comments on the intelligence bill itself. Like him the members of the Select Committee on Intelligence are dedicated to improving the quality of intelligence available to the U.S. Government.

I have consulted with the members of the Intelligence Committee and can say that the committee has no objection to inclusion in its classified report on the bill the material of interest to the Senator from North Carolina.

The amendment which the Senator has offered to the bill reflects certain changes in the nature of a supplement, which would be incorporated into the committee's classified report on intelligence programs. Material in the supplement relates to the subjects listed in the amendment and it is available to be read by any Member of the Senate who so wishes.

Mr. President, in view of the agreement of the committee for the inclusion of supplementary material in its classified report, members of the committee will not object to a motion by the Senator from North Carolina that his amendment be adopted. However, prior to proceeding with that motion, I would like to engage in two colloquies with the Senator on the subjects of CIA analysis and on the subject of counterintelligence.

After hearing of the Senator's concerns in these areas it appeared for a variety of reasons more desirable to discuss them here than to include them in the classified report on the bill.

With respect to the issue of how CIA analysts use their time or basic research, as proposed by the Senator or current reporting and policy support tasks such as briefing, I felt that a discussion on the floor would be sufficient to alert the Director of Central Intelligence to the Senate's interest on this issue.

I think we have agreed on a colloquy. If the Senator wants to proceed in certain areas, he can do so.

Mr. HELMS. Very well.

Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman. I do have some questions which I wish to direct to the distinguished chairman concerning the kind of responsibility that the CIA analyst must assume today.